



## **THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND**

**Submitted to the Committee on Local Governance, Housing  
and Chiefs' Affairs**

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# 1. Introduction and Background

This paper is a response to the request made by the Committee on Local Governance, Housing and Chiefs' Affairs in which the committee requested that the Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR) contributes to the Committee's resolve to review the implementation of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Zambia. ZIPAR in this note gives its major observations on the management of the CDF and offers recommendations on the way forward in the management of the CDF. ZIPAR has in the past commented on the management and utilization of the Constituency Development Fund through various publications and articles. These articles have been based on wide literature reviewed from CDF stakeholders such as the CDF alliance and many other development players in Zambia. ZIPAR has also developed a resource allocation model for the CDF.

The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Zambia was first approved by Parliament in 1995 as a government initiative for allocating and delivering development funds for micro-community projects on an annual basis to all constituencies. Besides Zambia, at least 23 other countries have adopted the CDF concept<sup>1</sup>.

CDF was first introduced as a way of empowering Members of Parliament (MPs) to respond to emergencies such as funerals in their respective constituencies. However, over time the fund has evolved into an important developmental tool for constituencies. The CDF now empower local communities by providing funding for micro-community development projects<sup>2</sup>. The major goal of CDFs is therefore to meet local communities' demand for developmental projects<sup>3</sup>, which are not in the priority lists of the regular structures of national and local government arguably due to the absence of effective links with local communities. CDF allows government to bypass central bureaucracies and deliver goods and services directly to constituents<sup>4</sup>.

CDF has grown from ZMW60, 000 in 1996 to ZMW210 million in 2014. In real terms the fund has grown by 140%. Over time CDF has been expected to provide services such as water supply and sanitation, roads, education and health infrastructure among other services needed in constituencies. Even though the fund has increased over the years, it is not sufficient to meet the needs that most constituencies have especially the most deprived in the rural areas.

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<sup>1</sup> These include Bhutan, Ghana, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Southern Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

<sup>2</sup> Government Republic of Zambia, (2006) Revised Guidelines on the Management and Utilization of Constituency Development Fund, Lusaka

<sup>3</sup> These projects are outlined in the Guidelines on the Management and Utilization of Constituency Development Fund (2006) and they are essentially a subset of the 63 specific functions of the Local Authorities provided for in Section 61 of the Local Government Act of 1991.

<sup>4</sup> Economics Association of Zambia (2011), Impact of the Constituency Development fund in Zambia

With the transfer of responsibilities, authority, functions, as well as power and appropriate resources, to provincial, district and sub-district levels, councils would have sufficient funds to address the needs of the districts. The CDF in its current form was born out of inefficiencies for government to transfer power from the central administration to the districts. To address these inefficiencies and ensure appropriate devolution of power from central government to the districts, in 2002, Zambia developed a decentralization policy providing for the strengthening of local government to facilitate more effective citizen participation in governance and accountable delivery of public services. The decentralisation policy which was revised in 2013 specifies the list of functions to be performed at central government level, provincial level and at district level. Central government is reserved the functions of regulation while the actual planning and implementation of district development projects is the function of the local authorities. As per the decentralisation policy, government in 2015 introduced the Local Government Equalisation Fund (LGEF) which accounts for over 70% of funding to the councils (2016 National Budget). However, apart from the LGEF, very little has been implemented in the decentralisation policy such as devolving decision making authority, functions and resources from the centre to the lowest level with matching resources, coordinating and implementing mechanisms to ensure a “bottom up” flow of integrated development planning and budgeting from the District to the central government; and develop and implement a legal and institutional framework to promote autonomy in decision making at local level<sup>5</sup>.

In the following sections, we discuss our major observations on the management of the CDF and also provide short, medium and long term recommendations on the way forward in the management of the CDF.

## **2. CDF management and utilization in Zambia**

### **2.1 Management**

- i. ZIPAR notes that the management of the CDF is supported by a simple guiding framework and that the guidelines are clear regarding procurement and accounting; the exact recipients of the funds; and the types of projects to be implemented. The guidelines also specify support structures necessary for the successful implementation of the CDF. However, the guidelines do not seem to address sanctions to deter abuse of the funds whether by local authorities, local politicians or local community members.<sup>6</sup>
- ii. ZIPAR also observes that the Constituency Development Committees (CDCs), which are by law the bodies vested with the authority to decide the utilisation of the CDF, operate under the influence of the area Member of Parliament (MP). The MP according to the CDF guidelines recommends 4 community leaders to sit on the CDC. This poses a risk of

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<sup>5</sup> Revised Decentralisation Policy 2013

<sup>6</sup> Economics Association of Zambia (2011), Impact of the Constituency Development fund in Zambia

enhancing the influence of the MP which might make it relatively easy to obtain their backing<sup>7</sup> in project selection and hence the utilisation of the fund.

- iii. Community participation in CDF projects is also passive. Most often local communities are either not aware of the CDF projects or they are simply indifferent about them<sup>8</sup>. This is notwithstanding the fact that the CDF accountability structure includes local community participation at different levels. Thus, some of the compromises in the CDF mechanism and setbacks in CDF projects are partly due to the ineffective participation of local communities.<sup>9</sup>
- iv. The traditional role of the legislature is national policy and law making and overseeing implementation of those national policies and laws by the executive creating a critical complimentary relationship between the two wings of Government. The introduction of CDF potentially complicates the basic relationship of the legislature with the executive as well as with their electorates. Consequently this compromises the oversight function of the legislature in that MP's involvement in the implementation of CDF may mean failure by the legislature to ensure that the executive deliver to the satisfaction of their electorate.
- v. We also observe that there is a lack of clear guidelines to address sanctions to deter abuse of the fund which has often resulted in misappropriation of funds. Misappropriation of CDF has been reported in the media and there have been various calls by the public to instigate stiffer punishment against the culprits. This misappropriation has even resulted in the Ministry of Finance taking over the disbursement of the fund in 2014 from the Ministry of Local Government and Housing.
- vi. We also note that the failure of Government systems to provide services to the districts has burdened the Councils to undertake developmental projects that are beyond their scope. Ideally the CDF should only be used to manage small projects that can be completed within a year but because of the depth of deprivation in most constituencies, the CDFs have been used to fund big projects such as construction of schools.

## **2.2 Disbursement and Utilization**

- i. The disbursement of an equal quantum of funding per constituency has equity concerns because constituencies are not equal. This kind of allocation favours smaller, least populated constituencies against greatly populated and or the poorest – where needs are greatest. The blanket allocation of CDFs across the country, without recourse to policy targets such as rural development underlines the nation's failure to address equitable development.

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<sup>7</sup> Caritas Zambia (2011), Study Report on the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), Allocation, Disbursement and Utilization

<sup>8</sup> Economics Association of Zambia (2011), Impact of the Constituency Development fund in Zambia

<sup>9</sup> Economics Association of Zambia (2011), Impact of the Constituency Development fund in Zambia

- ii. The CDF has grown by 94% between 2011 and 2014 from ZMW108 million to ZMW210 million respectively. However in terms of proportion in total GRZ grants to Local authorities, the CDF over the years has reduced from 42% in 2011 to 21% in 2016. Government increased restructuring grants to the councils from ZMW75 million in 2011 to ZMW306 million in 2014. The restructuring grants beyond 2014 were abolished. However Government has introduced the Local Government Equalisation Fund which now accounts for 72% of funding to councils (2016 national budget). CDF as a proportion of funding to councils has reduced over the years but it has growth highly as a fund. However this growth has not been met with similar development in the communities. The impact on the communities has been minimal.
- iii. ZIPAR also notes a number of weaknesses in project selection under CDF. Firstly ZIPAR notes that under the projects that are eligible for CDF, income generating activities are included. Empowerment programmes which facilitate income generating activities should be left to the already existing government structures such as the Youth Development Fund, Citizen Economic Empowerment and other empowerment programmes. Secondly there is need to link the projects under CDF to district plans and National Development Plans<sup>10</sup>. This will ensure sustainability. There is also need to coordinate various government projects with CDF projects to avoid duplication of projects.

### **2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation**

- i. The CDF guidelines provide for 10% of the CDF to be retained in the account of the constituency to meet administrative costs of which monitoring and evaluation is included. Again constituencies differ in size and as such this allocation especially for larger constituencies may not be enough for effective monitoring and evaluation. This has resulted in uncompleted works.
- ii. ZIPAR observes that the administration of CDFs can be challenging. Arguably, CDF has resulted in additional or parallel administrative structure that places extra burden to local authorities<sup>11</sup>. CDF has been criticised to undermine local government structures (Ibid). In countries where CDF does not flow through existing executive administrative structures the strain it places on the experience and skills base of monitoring structures comprising local authority offices and local communities can be extreme. In Zambia's case 10% of the CDF used as administrative costs have been said to be insufficient for larger constituencies to effectively monitor projects. Evidence exists that some project failures could have been avoided with a little more supervision and monitoring.

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<sup>10</sup> There is need first to adopt a bottom up approach in developing National and district plans to ensure effective participation of the local communities

<sup>11</sup> FOSUP (2012): A review of the Constituency Development Fund mechanism in Zambia

### 3. Recommendations

From the foregoing discussions, it has been observed that the CDF concept has potential to positively impact local communities' welfare when distributed equitably, local structures are strengthened, project selection is based on projects that can be completed within a year and effective monitoring and evaluation is undertaken. However, the complex of issues associated with CDF implementation and utilisation has led to long project lead times and excessively delayed project impacts. The reform process required to realise positive impacts may neither be easy nor short term. ZIPAR therefore makes recommendations in terms of interim, medium and long term:

#### 3.1 Interim Measures

##### **Use of the resource allocation formula to distribute the CDF**

The CDF should be apportioned using an allocation formula in order to uphold its core purpose of poverty alleviation. The use of a resource allocation formula is likely to distribute resources fairer in the interim and ensure relatively needier areas benefit in proportion to their needs. This has potential to increase the impact of the CDF. The allocation formula should be built on the framework of deprivation which includes incidence of poverty among other variables<sup>12</sup>. It may be argued that the more deprived the constituency, the greater the social benefit of the projects.

ZIPAR has developed a formula that allocates resources based on the deprivation of the constituencies. The formula takes into account the following:

- Population size: constituencies with relatively larger population should get a larger share of the CDF
- Access to education, health, water and sanitation: constituencies with relatively high levels of deprivation in these services should get a larger share of the CDF
- Living conditions e.g. type of housing: constituencies with the lowest living standards should get a larger share of the CDF.
- Levels of employment in the area: constituencies with the fewest employment opportunities should get a larger share of the CDF

The formula can be applied either by basing allocations: purely on a needs approach<sup>13</sup> or the second approach, is by allocating each constituency a minimum amount of ZMW1 million, and

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<sup>12</sup> See Annex 1 for the distribution of Constituencies in Zambia according to deprivation.

<sup>13</sup> See Annex 2 for the distribution of the CDF to all the constituencies using method 1 based on the study

then the additional amount of ZMW60 million provided in the 2016 National budget is allocated using the formula<sup>14</sup>.

It is therefore recommended that there should be no upward adjustments to the CDF allocations in real terms until a rational realignment of allocations to human needs is in place to avoid inefficient utilisation of public resources.

### **3.2 Medium Term Measures**

In an effort to foster comprehensive local development, constituencies should develop and submit to their respective council chambers for approval 5-year development plans clearly outlining constituency development objectives that are aligned to National Development Priorities. A constituency development conference facilitated by the planning departments of local authorities and the DDCC should be held within the context of National Development Planning to come up with a five year constituency development plan that would subsequently feed into the district development plan. It is in the same vein recommended that the timing of the suggested conference should be contra-cyclical to that of the regular general elections process to avoid politicisation appeals. The expected role of elected constituency officials is provision of leadership in the mobilisation of their communities to ensure inclusive participation.

Annual CDF plans which may be developed by the CDC should thus be based on the immediate objectives of the 5-year constituency development plan. In this regard, a superior and legislated watchdog institution in the form of the DDCC, with power to sanction institutions that deliberately ignore the constituency development plan in the implementation of CDF projects may be necessary. With broad-based ownership and strengthened oversight, the constituency development plans could potentially enhance communities' demand for accountability in the use of CDFs.

The dearth of evidence of impact on community wellbeing associated with CDF projects makes a strong case for conducting an impact assessment. However, lack of constituency level CDF strategic plans and requisite baseline surveys given that all constituencies are equally treated complicate the feasibility of an impact evaluation. It is thus recommended that baseline constituency/community wellbeing and capacities survey is undertaken. Such a baseline survey would still retain its importance even in the long-term where this paper recommends that local authorities take almost exclusive responsibility of CDFs.

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<sup>14</sup> See Annex 3 for the distribution of the CDF to all the constituencies using method 2 that allows for a minimum threshold based on the study *Resource allocation model for the Constituency Development Fund, ZIPAR*



### 3.3 Long Term Measures

The main long term strategy for the CDF would be to fully contextualise it within local authorities' administration. There is therefore need to speed up decentralisation, by building requisite local capacities and devolution of responsibilities and matching resources to local authorities. This may include delegation of revenue collection to local authorities is necessary. This way government will be able to circumvent resource wastages associated with having parallel governance structures for delivery of related developmental services to local communities. Further, financing of constituency development projects could be done using a proportion of the locally collected revenue. Such a measure could increase local communities' ownership of constituency development projects and consequent desire for improved accountability in the way funds are utilised.

The National Decentralisation Policy of 2002 among its objectives set out to devise formulae for disbursement of funds to Councils and to establish a special Equalization Fund to enable rural districts attract investments and retain qualified human resources thereby ensuring sustainable decentralization. In line with these objectives the Local Government Equalisation Fund was introduced in 2015 that uses a resource allocation formula. The fund takes into account the deprivation of the constituencies.

Seemingly, the LGEF would be playing the same role as does the CDF. If both of these continue to run parallel, it would be a duplication of roles and an overload of responsibilities especially for local councils. In the name of value for money, and the need to improve efficiency in management of public funds, the two may have to be combined so that they are administered and managed as one. Looking at the issues surrounding the CDF, it would be more appropriate for it to be swallowed under the LGEF for better and easy management.

Despite this, re-aligning the administration of the CDF should be taken with a lot of caution. The current political context makes CDF very strategic in the sense that all constituencies, regardless of political affiliation do receive funds. With other resources, the ruling party may have some relative power in terms of influencing where resources should go. This disadvantages areas that are not represented by members of the ruling party. At the moment there is no way of ensuring that this will not be the case in the absence of CDF. This is the reason for thinking carefully before abolishing CDF.

Importantly, to ensure the constituency office remains with some funds for various activities and emergencies such as funerals, a smaller allocation should still continue to be channelled to the MPs office. However, this fund should be auditable to ensure accountability and prudent public.

# Annex

## Annex 1: Distribution of Constituencies into Quintiles

Distribution of constituencies from the richest 1st Quintile to the poorest 5th Quintile									
First Quintile		Second Quintile		Third Quintile		Fourth Quintile		Fifth Quintile	
Kabwata	-2.53	Bwacha	-1.07	Masaiti	0.14	Milanzi	0.49	Chama North	0.79
Lusaka Central	-2.39	Chipata Central	-1.02	Msanjala	0.15	Mbala	0.50	Mafinga	0.79
Nkana	-2.20	Chongwe	-0.94	Nangoma	0.17	Mkushi South	0.51	Mfuwe	0.81
Munali	-2.18	Solwezi Central	-0.82	Mambwe	0.19	Chinsali	0.52	Lupososhi	0.82
Kantanshi	-2.05	Mongu Central	-0.74	Kaoma central	0.24	Mapatizya	0.54	Lukulu east	0.82
Matero	-2.03	Choma	-0.68	Rufunsa	0.27	Petauke	0.54	Chifunabuli	0.84
Roan	-1.97	Monze Central	-0.59	Mpongwe	0.29	Lukashya	0.56	Malole	0.84
Kabushi	-1.97	Katuba	-0.48	Sesheke	0.29	Solwezi East	0.58	Mwinilunga	0.84
Wusakile	-1.96	Kasama Central	-0.41	Serenje	0.29	Chipangali	0.59	Ikelenge	0.88
Nchanga	-1.95	Chikankanta	-0.40	Chadiza	0.31	Mufumbwe	0.59	Chembe	0.91
Chifubu	-1.89	Mwembezi	-0.24	Luangeni	0.31	Mwansabombwe	0.59	Kanchibiya	0.93
Mandevu	-1.86	Mpika	-0.22	Isoka	0.33	Mwandi	0.60	Mulobezi	0.95
Livingstone	-1.84	Chisamba	-0.16	Lundazi	0.34	Nchelenge	0.64	Kabompo East	0.95
Kanyama	-1.79	Magoye	-0.14	Itezhi Tezhi	0.34	Kapoche	0.65	Nalikwanda	0.96
Chawama	-1.74	Mumbwa	-0.13	Kasenengwa	0.38	Luena	0.65	Chama South	0.97
Kwacha	-1.73	Kalomo Central	-0.11	Mporokoso	0.40	Muchinga	0.65	Kaputa	1.00
Kabwe Central	-1.73	Siavonga	-0.06	Kafalafuta	0.40	Bangweulu	0.66	Nalolo	1.02
Bwana Mkubwa	-1.71	Kapiri Mposhi	-0.05	Dundumwezi	0.40	Senanga	0.66	Kalabo Central	1.04
Chililabombwe	-1.62	Mkushi North	-0.02	Namwala	0.40	Chitambo	0.66	Luampa	1.05
Kamfinsa	-1.58	Keembe	0.02	Gwembe	0.41	Shiwangandu	0.67	Chienge	1.06
Mazabuka Central	-1.52	Mansa	0.02	Lufwanyama	0.43	Kabompo West	0.68	Mangango	1.06
Chimwemwe	-1.51	Mkaika	0.05	Bahati	0.44	Pambashe	0.69	Chavuma	1.08
Kankoyo	-1.49	Nakonde	0.06	Nyimba	0.44	Mpulungu	0.70	Chilubi	1.09
Luanshya	-1.46	Bweengwa	0.06	Solwezi West	0.44	Chipili	0.72	Chimbamilonga	1.15
Chilanga	-1.45	Moomba	0.09	Mambilima	0.44	Chasefu	0.74	Liuwa	1.17
Chingola	-1.40	Mbabala	0.09	Mwense	0.45	Lumezi	0.75	Zambezi West	1.20
Ndola	-1.31	Pemba	0.09	Lubansenshi	0.45	Vubwi	0.76	Sinjembela	1.24
Kalulushi	-1.31	Sinazongwe	0.10	Kasempa	0.45	Lunte	0.76	lukulu west	1.31
Mufurila	-1.29	Feira	0.10	Sinda	0.46	Senga Hill	0.78	Luapula	1.33
Kafue	-1.20	Kawambwa	0.12	Katombola	0.47	Zambezi East	0.78	Sikongo	1.48

## Annex 2: Scenario 1: CDF resource allocation formula

Constituency	Re-allocated Amount	Constituency	Re-allocated Amount	Constituency	Re-allocated Amount	Constituency	Re-allocated Amount	Constituency	Re-allocated Amount
Kabwata	5,068	Kalulushi	1,157,483	Masaiti	1,537,093	Milanzi	1,863,615	Chama North	1,679,594
Lusaka Central	155,584	Mufurila	719,603	Msanzala	3,089,780	Mbala	3,177,968	Mafinga	2,080,344
Nkana	262,173	Kafue	1,522,083	Nangoma	2,163,937	Mkushi South	737,281	Mfuwe	850,516
Munali	878,503	Bwacha	1,155,963	Mambwe	1,780,265	Chinsali	2,505,910	Lupososhi	2,201,847
Kantanshi	255,601	Chipata Central	2,288,113	Kaoma central	2,286,709	Mapatizya	2,032,242	Lukulu east	1,859,827
Matero	1,336,413	Chongwe	2,133,084	Rufunsa	1,352,624	Petauke	1,931,047	Chifunabuli	2,665,874
Roan	306,279	Solwezi Central	2,149,714	Mpongwe	2,493,469	Lukashya	2,102,838	Malole	4,834,459
Kabushi	502,751	Mongu Central	1,508,295	Sesheke	1,173,198	Solwezi East	1,075,122	Mwinilunga	3,339,202
Wusakile	529,144	Choma	2,151,834	Serenje	1,726,478	Chipangali	3,633,483	Ikelenge	1,065,141
Nchanga	487,968	Monze Central	1,868,380	Chadiza	1,687,708	Mufumbwe	1,717,333	Chembe	1,412,180
Chifubu	599,878	Katuba	1,544,594	Luangeni	2,029,286	Mwansabombwe	1,341,350	Kanchibiya	2,699,494
Mandevu	2,275,179	Kasama Central	3,220,334	Isoka	1,960,580	Mwandi	742,724	Mulobezi	1,005,936
Livingstone	912,221	Chikankanta	1,211,798	Lundazi	3,544,911	Nchelenge	4,599,492	Kabompo East	1,589,625
Kanyama	2,560,767	Mwembezi	1,149,178	Itezhi Tezhi	1,867,542	Kapoche	3,620,856	Nalikhanda	1,326,295
Chawama	1,397,683	Mpika	2,069,870	Kasenengwa	2,706,942	Luena	1,530,352	Chama South	1,679,462
Kwacha	1,004,201	Chisamba	2,340,664	Mporokoso	1,139,084	Muchinga	1,613,514	Kaputa	2,375,105
Kabwe Central	903,019	Magoye	1,613,810	Kafulafuta	1,197,008	Bangweulu	2,767,161	Nalolo	1,873,057
Bwana Mkubwa	925,259	Mumbwa	2,022,468	Dundumwezi	2,235,103	Senanga	2,147,904	Kalabo Central	1,928,961
Chililabombwe	794,736	Kalomo Central	2,490,206	Namwala	2,861,293	Chitambo	1,479,924	Luampa	1,489,612
Kamfinsa	786,356	Siavonga	2,113,584	Gwembe	1,481,429	Shiwangandu	1,816,512	Chienge	3,888,776
Mazabuka Central	952,385	Kapiri Mposhi	5,980,590	Lufwanyama	2,204,492	Kabompo West	1,343,246	Mangango	1,990,756
Chimwemwe	1,130,323	Mkushi North	3,076,954	Bahati	2,590,526	Pambashe	1,270,503	Chavuma	1,199,668
Kankoyo	447,248	Keembe	2,911,324	Nyimba	2,393,095	Mpulungu	3,008,413	Chipilubi	2,786,923
Luanshya	1,000,970	Mansa	3,303,465	Solwezi West	2,410,380	Chipili	1,003,171	Chimbamilonga	1,696,041
Chilanga	1,095,778	Mkaika	2,346,713	Mambilima	728,409	Chasefu	3,093,375	Liuwa	930,233
Chingola	1,370,419	Nakonde	2,935,389	Mwense	1,734,663	Lumezi	2,918,604	Zambezi West	776,562
Ndola	1,617,772	Bweengwa	1,485,710	Lubansenshi	1,491,333	Vubwi	1,391,537	Sinjembela	3,336,509
Sinazongwe	2,534,823	Moomba	746,643	Kasempa	1,970,515	Lunte	1,806,598	lukulu west	1,000,485
Feira	607,118	Mbabala	1,440,641	Sinda	2,353,784	Senga Hill	2,898,696	Luapula	879,025
Kawambwa	1,192,127	Pemba	1,672,519	Katombola	2,980,839	Zambezi East	1,832,107	Sikongo	1,727,867

### Annex 3: Scenario 2: CDF resource allocation formula

Constituency	Re-allocated amount	Constituency	Re-allocated amount	Constituency	Re-allocated amount	Constituency	Re-allocated amount	Constituency	Re-allocated amount
Kabwata	1,012,156.57	Chipili	1,220,968.32	Luampa	1,328,402.33	Isoka	1,431,315.91	Chinsali	1,551,636.26
Lusaka Central	1,027,181.69	Mulobezi	1,221,714.77	Mongu Central	1,329,709.69	Kasempa	1,433,688.04	Sinazongwe	1,557,121.86
Nkana	1,053,031.86	Ikelenge	1,234,723.21	Kafue	1,330,776.72	Mangango	1,438,895.68	Bahati	1,570,111.92
Kantanshi	1,053,259.28	Solwezi East	1,236,720.01	Luena	1,337,023.22	Mumbwa	1,444,030.59	Chifunabuli	1,587,414.10
Roan	1,064,451.30	Chilanga	1,236,844.42	Masaiti	1,337,886.24	Luangeni	1,446,386.30	Kanchibiya	1,594,963.74
Kankoyo	1,096,570.42	Chimwemwe	1,243,873.61	Katuba	1,338,382.29	Mapatizya	1,447,394.44	Kasenengwa	1,595,609.43
Nchanga	1,102,839.23	Mporokoso	1,250,651.15	Kabompo East	1,350,365.36	Mpika	1,454,207.38	Bangweulu	1,609,411.86
Kabushi	1,105,831.56	Kalulushi	1,250,985.05	Ndola	1,350,790.75	Mafinga	1,458,335.84	Chilubi	1,614,458.46
Wusakile	1,111,495.14	Bwacha	1,251,701.11	Magoye	1,354,281.47	Lukashya	1,462,971.90	Namwala	1,629,624.79
Chifubu	1,127,123.95	Mwembezi	1,252,145.14	Muchinga	1,355,340.67	Siavonga	1,464,192.11	Senga Hill	1,638,603.20
Feira	1,133,439.08	Sesheke	1,258,055.38	Pemba	1,367,589.81	Chongwe	1,465,295.24	Keembe	1,639,649.43
Mufurila	1,156,109.42	Kawambwa	1,262,032.07	Chama North	1,370,040.30	Solwezi Central	1,469,547.12	Lumezi	1,642,945.29
Mambilima	1,160,308.36	Kafulafuta	1,263,398.15	Chama South	1,370,183.81	Choma	1,470,638.22	Nakonde	1,645,032.63
Mkushi South	1,162,298.52	Chavurna	1,264,497.51	Chadiza	1,371,247.87	Senanga	1,473,041.80	Katombola	1,656,084.89
Mwandi	1,163,540.05	Chikankanta	1,265,621.09	Chimbamilonga	1,373,992.94	Nangoma	1,475,740.91	Mpulungu	1,662,636.45
Moomba	1,164,095.09	Matero	1,279,228.35	Mufumbwe	1,378,130.12	Mandevu	1,483,126.49	Mkushi North	1,675,918.90
Kamfinsa	1,169,331.86	Pambashe	1,279,830.40	Serenje	1,379,760.37	Lupososhi	1,485,134.41	Msanzala	1,679,248.52
Chililabombwe	1,170,878.57	Nalikwanda	1,292,334.92	Sikongo	1,381,269.29	Lufwanyama	1,485,143.93	Chasefu	1,681,414.48
Zambezi West	1,171,257.93	Mwansabombwe	1,295,348.15	Mwense	1,381,769.08	Dundumwezi	1,491,828.49	Mbala	1,699,531.06
Munali	1,178,737.65	Kabompo West	1,295,840.23	Mambwe	1,391,434.58	Chipata Central	1,498,621.39	Kasama Central	1,705,827.85
Mfuwe	1,187,393.53	Chingola	1,296,618.54	Lunte	1,397,990.11	Kaoma central	1,502,883.42	Mansa	1,725,811.65
Kabwe Central	1,193,256.57	Rufunsa	1,297,493.42	Shiwangandu	1,400,070.41	Chisamba	1,513,806.11	Mwinilunga	1,735,783.58
Luapula	1,193,909.33	Chawama	1,298,871.30	Zambezi East	1,403,629.89	Mkaika	1,515,661.90	Sinjembela	1,735,881.60
Livingstone	1,193,981.97	Vubwi	1,306,550.84	Monze Central	1,408,969.62	Sinda	1,518,059.06	Lundazi	1,779,871.98
Bwana Mkubwa	1,198,220.76	Chembe	1,311,219.02	Lukulu east	1,409,780.18	Kaputa	1,523,557.39	Kapoche	1,797,398.26
Liuwa	1,205,137.56	Mbabala	1,316,622.91	Milanzi	1,410,208.19	Nyimba	1,526,662.24	Chipangali	1,800,032.51
Mazabuka Central	1,205,421.47	Chitambo	1,325,930.65	Itezhi Tezhi	1,410,858.62	Solwezi West	1,530,474.64	Chienge	1,857,339.93
Kwacha	1,214,833.15	Gwembe	1,325,996.15	Nalolo	1,412,909.15	Kanyama	1,546,248.24	Nchelenge	2,012,907.91
Luanshya	1,216,307.56	Bweengwa	1,326,486.00	Petauke	1,425,123.86	Kalomo Central	1,546,781.16	Malole	2,065,257.33
lukulu west	1,220,693.48	Lubansenshi	1,328,219.22	Kalabo Central	1,425,249.73	Mpongwe	1,548,449.14	Kapiri Mposhi	2,313,569.92